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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

In Re:
/

SERGE B. GUDMUNDSON,
Disciplinary Proceeding/
Petitioner.

/

Case No.
13620

/

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

' STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein a Complaint was
filed with the Board of Commissioners of the
Utah State Bar by a Screening Committee of the
Utah State Bar, alleging that the Petitioner,
who is an attorney and coxinselor at law of the
State of Utah and a member of the Utah State
Bar, allegedly conducted himself in an unprofessional manner as charged in the Complaint
of the Screening Committee of the Utah State
Bar.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar made a finding of fact, alleging the
violation of certain Canons of ethics by the
Petitioner and made a recommendation that the
Petitioner be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITIONER
The Petitioner seeks reversal of the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and decision
rendered by the Bar Commission/ and seeks to
establish before the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, that the conclusions of the Bar
Commission are in error and that the decision
and recommendation for disciplining the
Petitioner is not proper under the existing
facts and law and is a harsh and unwarranted
recommendation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Petitioner is an attorney and counselor
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the State of Utah and a member of the Utah
State Bar, having graduated from the University
of Utah School of Law in 1950; having been
admitted to the practice of law in the State
of Utah in 1951; and having offices at 217
Eccles Building, in Ogden, Utah. (R-14)
The Complaint of the Bar set forth as a
first count an allegation concerning one,
Velma Joy Beck, an alleged violation of Rule III,
Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3); Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(2)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Utah State Bar, alleging that the said Velma
Beck employed the Petitioner in August of 1972
to obtain a Decree of Divorce for her and paid
a sum of money to the Petitioner, alleging the
failure of the Petitioner in expeditiously
handling the matter for said client and by
the failing in repayment to the client of a
portion of the fee in connection therewith. (R-2)
The original Complaint of the Bar alleged as
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a second count, that the Petitioner was
employed by Gregory W. Green to represent
Green in an action, and with the failure of
the Petitioner after termination of his
services to refund to the client the fees paid,
and in doing so alleged in the original Complair
violation of Rule III, Canon 6, PR 6-101(A)(3);
Canon 7, PR 7-101 (A) (2); and Canon 9, PR 9-101
CB)(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar. (R-3)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PUE PROCESS REQUIRES TIMELY NOTICE.
In the allegations set forth in the Complaini
of the Bar regarding the conduct of the
Petitioner in his relationship to Gregory W.
Green, it is interesting to note that not until
the time of the hearing itself was the Petition*
actually advised of the charges against him.
(TR-4)

The Board of Bar Commissioners found
-4-
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the Green matter.

The Board of the Bar

Commission having amended the Complaint on
the day of the hearing (TR-4) and proceeding
to a hearing on the amended Complaint in
spite of the objection by the Petitioner to
a continuation of the hearing on the amended
Complaint. (TR-37)
The Petitioner was denied an opportunity
to prepare an adequate defense and to have a
meaningful Due Process hearing by reason of
the failure of the Complaint to set forth the
actual Canon which the Bar alleged was violated
by the Petitioner.

The Bar having found no

violation by the Petitioner as to the other
two Canons allegedly violated by the Petitioner
in the Green matter. (R-18)
The record before the Bar will reveal that
the Petitioner was greatly disturbed by the
fact that there was to be a full hearing in
the matter as to Gregory Green, in that the
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Petitioner alleges that in his appearance
before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar,
Petitioner alleged (TR-3) that he was at a
disadvantage, in that it was his belief that
there was no charge as to Green, in that he
had been advised by the Screening Committee
that if the matter was settled to the satisfaction of the client, that there would be a
dismissal of the action, and that as a result
thereof, the Petitioner did not even bring his
file and records in the matter to the Bar
Commission hearing. (TR-3)
The record before this Court shows that the
father of Gregory Green, who had paid the fee
to the Petitioner on behalf of his son, Gregory
Green, had been a friend and client of the
Petitioner for many years. (TR-53)

The record

further reveals that the Petitioner had rendered
many services without charge to both the
Complainant, Gregory Green, and to his father,
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who had paid the money on behalf of his son,
Gregory.

That there had been a lack of

mutuality of payment by the Greens to the
Petitioner and that in retaining part of the
monies, the Petitioner felt in his own mind,
that he was justified in being paid for the
services of representing both the son in the
hearings previous to the Petitioner being
retained for the purpose of filing a suit on
behalf of the son, Gregory Green, and the many
previous services rendered by the Petitioner
on behalf of the father of Gregory Green, and
it is evident from a reading of the Transcript
of the trauma of the Petitioner in finding his
being charged with the alleged retention of
unearned funds, in that in the Petitioner's
own mind in his testimony before the Commission
of the Bar, was evidenced that his feelings
were that he had rendered many services and
was merely retaining some of the funds for
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which he had an offset of fees from previous
services rendered. (TR-47,-48,-49,-51,-52)
It is submitted to this Honorable Court,
that the Petitioner was unable to be prepared
to answer any charges as alleged in the second
count in relationship to Gregory Green, in
that:
1.

Petitioner had been led to believe that

there would be no hearing as to that matter,
in that there had been an Accord and Satisfaction between the parties in settlement of
any monies owed by the Petitioner to the client,
and (TR-3, Pl.Exh.10)
2.

That the notice in the Complaint served

upon the Petitioner set forth a Canon, namely
Canon 9, DR 9-101(B) (4), which is a non-existent
Canon and could not in any way inform and
advise the Petitioner as to the charge against
him prior to the time of the hearing, and (R-2)
3.

The Petitioner did not bring his file
-9-
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and the records and evidence which would have
been in mitigation of the charge against him as
to the Canon with which the Bar Commission founc
a violation, namely Canon 9, PR 9-102(b)(4),
based upon Petitioner's belief that there was
to be no hearing as to that matter and that the
Complaint was faulty in setting forth the
charge. (TR-31
POINT II
VIOLATION OF CANON REQUIRES INTENT.
In regards to the allegations set forth as
to the Complaint of Velma Joy Beck James/ hereinafter referred to as Beck, it was evidenced
that in the first instance the Complainant had
been a previous client of the Petitioner in a
prior divorce action.

The Complainant moved

back to Utah from California and again retained
the Petitioner in August, 1972, in an attempt
to attain a property settlement and divorce
.from her successive spouse who resided in
-10-
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California. (TR-7)
The Complainant, Beck, was advised that she
would not be eligible for an action in divorce
until after she had established residence in
Utah for a period of three months, paying to
the Petitioner the sum of $25.00 as a retainer
for the filing fees of the divorce. (TR-7,-8)
The Complainant further advised the Petitioner,
that she was a 40-percent owner in a business
that she was engaged in with her husband in
California CTR-13), and that she wanted
one-half of the business as part of the divorce
settlement.
The Petitioner advised Beck that there was
no jurisdiction in a Utah divorce action for
obtaining a personal property settlement from
her husband and that Petitioner would make
an attempt to see if the husband was willing
to make a property settlement for a divorce.
(TR-13,-141
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Petitioner, after a couple of telephone
calls with the spouse of Beck, determined that
the husband was threatening to file an attempted
murder charge against Beck if she should attempt
to obtain a California divorce, and the
Petitioner made telephone calls and communicatee
with the husband in an attempt to arrive at a
settlement without the necessity of going
through a Utah divorce action wherein the
Complainant would not be compensated. (TR-13,-1'
Beck admitted that she received a telephone
call from her husband after communications from
the Petitioner and that her husband had told
her to "drop dead". (TR-7)
Beck paid the Petitioner an additional
$50.00 on November 7, 1972; $75.00 on November
and $175.00 on February 5, 1973. (Ex.1,2,3,4)
The Petitioner was attempting during this
period of time to engage in a telephone conversation and letter writing ploy with the spouse
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the Complainant in an attempt to better the
position of his client, Beck,

Two days prior

to the Complainant receiving the notice of
her husband having obtained a divorce from
her in the California Courts, the Petitioner
recommended that they file a publication to
get jurisdiction over the husband, and obviously
was unable to file same prior to the time of
obtaining the notice from the husband of his
attaining of a divorce. (TR-14,-15)
It is also interesting to note that the
Complainant did not ask for the discharge of
her attorney until after she had written a
letter to the Grievance Committee of the Bar,
being sure to make a copy of same demanding a
refund of fees paid as a self-serving record
to bolster her claim to the Bar. (TR-15,-19)
The record further shows that the Complainant
was more interested in getting a divorce with
or without a property settlement, in that she
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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became married immediately after the obtaining
of a divorce by her husband, and as the record
shows, she has added the last name of "James"
to her previous names• (TR-19)
The Complainant testified and admitted,
that her first plan in discussing the divorce
with the Petitioner was in forcing her husband
into getting a divorce and settling the action
by a California divorce. (TR-21)

In accordance

with the belief of the Petitioner, the fee
paid to him was for the negotiations, letter
writing, and telephone conversations, in
addition to the filing of a Complaint, all in
line with the coercive attempt by Counsel to
compel the husband to obtain the divorce in
California. (TR-21,-22)
The record further reveals that the Petitions
had previously performed legal services for
Beck and that they had a good relationship,
and further, that the Petitioner did not always
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bill the Complainant for services which he
rendered for her. (TR-22)
The Petitioner believed that the fee of
$300.00, plus the filing fee, was for services
to be rendered to the Complainant in compelling
the obtaining of a California Decree and not
necessarily in obtaining a Utah Decree with
the hope of attempting to coerce a property
settlement of some kind as to the spouse of
the Complainant. (TR-22)
It is further submitted to this Honorable
Court, that on TR-30 of Record the Petitioner
was given an opportunity to file a Brief in
supplementation of the record as to the law
in regards to the subject matter before the
Bar Commission, which the Petitioner did
submit to the Bar on December 17, 1973, but
that nowhere in the record has there been an
inclusion of the Brief and certified statement
for the record made by the Petitioner.
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT BE
PUNITIVE.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court,
that the suspension, revocation, or disbarment
of an attorney at law is not a matter to be
taken lightly, for as Chief Justice John Marshal
stated in Ex Parte Burr 6 Law Edition 153:
"On the one hand, the profession
of an attorney is of great importance
to an individual, the prosperity of
his whole life may depend upon its
exercise* The right to exercise it
is not to be lightly or capriciously
taken from him."
This Court has previously held in Carter
Oil Company vs. State, 240 P.2d 787, that Boards
of quasi judicial powers must base their findings and orders on substantial evidence.
While the Petitioner would not impugn the
motives and work performed by members of the
Bar Commission in the performance of this
function, it should always be borne in mind
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as was stated in Geer vs. Stathopulos, 390
P.2d 606y Supreme Court of Colorado:
"That capricious or arbitrary exercise
of discretion by an administrative
board can arise, by exercise of its
discretion in such manner after a
consideration of evidence before it,
has clearly indicated that its action
is based on conclusions from the
evidence such that reasonable men
fairly and honestly considering the
evidence must reach contrary conclusions."
The Colorado Supreme Court further stated,
the abiding and well based principle, that
when a Court is called upon to review action
of an administrative agency, it should be placed
in the same position as such agency, and therefore, if the agency has some knowledge of some
fact, and acts upon such knowledge, it should
see to it that what it knows becomes part of
the record in order to permit the reviewing
Court to evaluate the matter so known.

It is

submitted to this Honorable Court, that in
the instant matter before the Court, the record
is so incomplete and so inconclusive as to
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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make difficult the task of this Honorable
Court to make a fair ascertainment of what
would be a just action in the matter it is
now considering.
It is submitted to this Court, that the
principle of law set forth in Marks vs. France,
325 P.2d 368, may be applicable in the instant
situation where the Court stated that an
administrative body, such as the Board of
Examiners in Optometry, cannot be the final
judge of reasonableness of its orders, and
while Courts will not be permitted to substitut
their Judgment for that of administrative
bodies, nevertheless Courts are definitely
charged with the solemn duty of determining
whether the procedure employed in reaching
Judgment, or whether Judgment itself as rendere
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppresive under
circumstances of each particular case.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the State
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Oklahoma Bar Association vs. Booth, 441
P.2d 405, (1966), used as a goal for the
purposes of the action of a Bar Commission,
that it did not have as the ultimate purpose
the disciplining of an attorney in order to
inflict punishment, but that the purpose was
purely purification of the Bar and protection
of the Courts and public generally.
The Court stated in the Bar Association of
San Francisco vs. Sullivan, 198 P. 7, that
in making a determination of unprofessional
conduct as to an attorney, that all reasonable
doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused
and where there are two or more reasonable
inferences may be drawn from a proved fact,
that, that inference leading to a conclusion
of innocence rather than one leading to a
conclusion of guilt will be accepted.
It is further submitted to this Honorable
Court, that the attorney before the Bar should
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be disciplined only for a wilful breach of
the rules of professional conduct, and that
to establish a wilful breach, it should be
demonstrated that the person charged, acted
or omitted to act purposely, that he knew
what he was doing or not doing, and that he
intended either to commit the act or to abstain
from committing it, and this principle of law
has been well established in the cases of
Palmquist vs» State Bar, 43 Cal.2d 428; In
Re Trombley, 193 P.2d 734; Towle vs. Matheus,
62 P. 1064,
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Talbot vs.
Schroeder, 475 P.2d 520, held that an attorney
is bound to discharge his duties to his client
with strictest fidelity and to observe the
highest and the utmost good faith, but that
at the same time, an attorney is not liable
to a client when acting in good faith, when
he makes mere errors of judgment, or for a
-20Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mistake as to an unsettled issue of law.

It

was further held in Eadun vs. Reuler, 146 Col.
347, 361 P.2d 445, (1961), that an attorney
is not liable simply because his client becomes
unhappy with the result.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable
Court that in the matter of the single count,
Re Gregory Green, for which the Petitioner was
held to be in violation of a specific Canon,
that he was not advised of that specific Canon
nor could he defend himself against it until
at the time of the actual hearing, in that the
Canon cited in the Complaint was unknown to
the Petitioner until the time of the hearing
and was a non-existent Canon and one for which
he could find no rule in any book setting
forth the Canons of ethics of the Bar of the
State of Utah; and that in the case of the
matter of Beck, that there is some indication
-21Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the vindictiveness of a client, who perhaps
through her own penuriousness, sought to gain
an advantage by a refund of funds which had
been well earned by the attorney, or at least,
in his opinion, believed he had so earned it.
Further, that the recommendation of the
Commission of the Bar is far in excess of any
punishment warranted to a man of long standing
and good character who has been a faithful
member of the Bar of this State for more than
23 years in which he has held forth as a
practicing attorney.
Respectfully submitted,

PETE N. VLAHOS of
VLAHOS & GALE
Suite 312 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
84401
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the above and foregoing Brief
of Petitioner was posted in the U.S. mail
postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney
for the Bar Commission/ Lauren N. Beasley,
Esq., at 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, on this <>J day of May, 1974.

PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ.
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